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THE QUALITY OF JUSTICE*
DAVID LUBAN**

Alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") elicits a startling variety of
responses from commentators. These range from suspicions that ADR
is little more than a con game designed to swindle the poor out of their
hard-won legal rights or "blame the victims,"' to concern that ADR waters down the morality of law, 2 to advocacy of ADR on efficiency
grounds-speed of disposition, cheapness relative to litigation, increased access-to an almost millenarian enthusiasm for ADR as a mode
3
of social ordering.
Such a welter of answers suggests that students of ADR are not asking the same questions. "Come, let us go down, and there confuse their
language, that they may not understand one another's speech." '4 In a
heated and, perhaps, stalemated controversy we should return to very
basic questions. What criteria should be used to evaluate ADR programs? What are the programs supposed to do? What do we mean
when we claim that they succeed or fail? What is the justice that they
pursue? Ultimately, what is justice?
Proponents of court-sponsored programs such as summary jury trials and court-annexed arbitration tend to focus attention, understandably enough, on speed of disposition. Judges want to clear their dockets.
Similarly, vendors and consumers of commercial ADR services focus on
ADR's cheapness relative to litigation. These are among the most significant and visible proponents of ADR, and as a consequence their concerns have dominated much of the debate. The effect has been to assess
ADR primarily on grounds of efficiency-what Marc Galanter calls "the
*
This essay originated as a report on a workshop on Identifying and Measuring
Quality in Dispute Resolution Processes and Outcomes held at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison Law School, July 13-14, 1987, and co-sponsored by the Dispute
Processing Research Program of the Institute for Legal Studies at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison Law School and the National Institute of Dispute Resolution.
**
Professor of Law, University of Maryland; Research Scholar, Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, University of Maryland at College Park.
1. SeeJ. AUERBACH,JUSTICE WrrHouT LAW? RESOLVING DisPuTEs WrrHouT LAWYERS

142-47 (1983); Lazerson, In the Halls ofJustice, the OnlyJustice is in the Halls, in THE PoLmcs
OF INFORMALJUSTICE 119 (1982); Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of
Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1984).
2. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073 (1984).
3. For example, Ron Kraybill, Director of the Mennonite Conciliation Service,
comments:
I view conflict resolution.., as a basic way of thinking about the world, how we
relate to other people, and how we solve problems. So our calling is to carry this
into the way of our society functions. I think about this much more broadly than
in professional terms: of beginning with children and teaching them of [sic] ways
of thinking and solving problems; of families, community institutions and
churches; of how government functions, of a whole way of being.
Kraybill, DispuTE RESoLUTION F., March 1987, at 6.
4. Genesis 11:7.
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production argument." 5
At least as important, however, is the "quality argument."'6 The
quality argument, in the words of one federal judge, stems from the
premise that "the absolute result of a trial is not as high a quality of
justice as the freely negotiated, give a little, take a little settlement." 7 It
is not just that ADR programs are supposed to be cheaper, faster, and
provide more access-it is that ADR is supposed to yield better justice.
As Richard Abel summarizes proponents' claims, informal justice "expresses certain fundamental values; rapid and thorough airing of controversies, participation by the disputants in resolving their own conflicts,
reduction of dependence on professionals, and greater involvement of
citizens in an essential aspect of democratic government."
The present essay, originally composed as a workshop report, is intended as a self-standing comment. My aim is to explore the quality
argument in light of contemporary work on the theory ofjustice, utilizing the workshop discussions as a reservoir of themes, arguments, and
illustrative material. Some of what I say synthesizes related points made
by several workshop participants, or extrapolates from their stated
views. Imitating Thucydides, "my method has been, while keeping as
closely as possible to the general sense of the words that were actually
used, to make the speakers say what, in my opinion, was called for by
each situation." 9
The essay is in three principal sections, each with subsections. The
first section draws some distinctions among theories ofjustice. The second section addresses the very important question of whether ADR
should measure itself against the baseline of adjudication or the baseline
of unmediated negotiation. The third section surveys contending accounts of what constitutes the quality ofjustice in ADR.
I.

THE FORMS OF JUSTICE

All Generalizations are Loose and Imperfect
At the outset, we must remind ourselves of Montaigne's self-referential warning that "all generalizations are loose and imperfect." As
Howard Bellman stresses, ADR is far too broad a category to say anything sensible about. ADR includes, after all, mediators and arbitrators,
but also "med-arbs," "reg-negs" (regulatory negotiators), ombudsmen,
judges engineering settlements in conference or conducting summary
jury trials, special masters, conciliators, purveyors of mini-trials, and
5. Galanter, . . . A Settlement Judge, Not a TrialJudge: Judicial Mediation in the United
States, 12J.L. & Soc'y 1, 8 (1985).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8.

THE POLITICS OF INFORMALJUSTICE (R. Abel ed. 1982).

9. THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELLOPONNESIAN WAR 47 (R. Warner, trans. 1954).
I am grateful to Peter Christiansen for the Thucydides allusion. Throughout this paper
unfootnoted statements attributed to specific individuals refer to their oral presentations
at the workshop. Tapes of the discussions are available through the Disputes Processing
Research Program, Madison, Wisconsin.
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others. These people can work for public agencies or private dispute
resolution companies; they can be court-annexed or not; their backgrounds can include law, psychotherapy, social work, industrial relations, or none at all; and they can work in sectors ranging from collective
bargaining to environmental disputes to small-claims court to family mediation. They can focus on interest-disputes or rights-disputes; they can
be paid by the disputants, by third parties, or by programs; they can be
professionals or volunteers; and the process itself may be voluntary or
compulsory. The number of relevantly different contexts may thus
range into the hundreds (a point stressed by Lawrence Mohr).
Why "relevantly different" contexts? Because the expectations and
understandings of the process may be wildly different in one context
than another. Labor mediators, for example, typically insist on absolute
confidentiality of the proceedings, but court-sanctioned divorce
mediators may be legally obligated to report child abuse. Similarly, labor mediators would find a requirement to introduce the interests of
third parties (such as consumers) into collective bargaining discussions
intolerable and weird, but family mediators who did not insist that parents consider the interests of their children would be derelict in their
duty, and mediators of a major environmental dispute should surely remind the parties of the public interests involved.10
On Bellman's analysis, the key dimensions distinguishing ADR contexts are their modalities-mediation, arbitration, summary jury trial,
and others-and their settings-labor, family, business litigation, and
others. This suggests classifying ADR programs on a two-dimensional
grid indexed by these variables. We must then consider the possibility
that the requirements of justice may differ among the many entries on
the grid.
This possibility would, I believe, have to be argued on a case-bycase basis, and I do not propose to attempt this here.1 1 Instead, I will
confine myself to one type of setting-legal disputes in which ADR is
undertaken either to forestall litigation or as part of litigation-and will
venture some loose and imperfect generalizations, trusting to those
more knowledgeable to correct and qualify them in modes and settings
to which they do not apply.
Justice Within the System and RevisionaryJustice
A running disagreement pervades recent discussions about the
quality of justice in ADR. Proponents of ADR argue that ADR resolves
disputes more justly than either litigation or unmediated negotiation,
while critics-especially critics on the left-suspect that ADR programs
simply "cool out" legitimate grievances and thereby perpetuate a system
that is fundamentally unjust.
10. Engram & Markowitz, Ethical Issues in Mediation: Divorce and Labor Compared, 8 MEDIATION Q. 19 (1985).
11. But see Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of Civil Justice: Jurisdictional
PrinciplesforProcess Choice, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 893.
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Though this tension is real, the dichotomy is not, for an ADR program may resolve disputes justly (in one sense of the word) and cool out
legitimate grievances, thereby perpetuating a system that is fundamentally unjust (in another sense). Indeed, the better the ADR system is at
resolving disputes justly (in the first sense), the more effectively it will
cool out legitimate grievances and perpetuate the system, which may itself be unjust (in the second sense). Thus, one reason that proponents
and critics arrive at different answers to the quality question may be that
it is not one question but two, corresponding to the two senses of
"justice."
These two senses are justice within the system and revisionary justice.
The former treats the social world we live in and the constraints it imposes as given, seeking justice within the terms defined by that social
world and those constraints. Revisionary justice measures justice according to a more detached or even utopian standard, abstracts from
constraints imposed by the system as it is currently constituted, and subjects the social world in which we live to assessment and criticism.
Take, for example, Edelman's analysis of voluntary non-union
grievance procedures instituted by employers. According to Edelman,
employers were motivated to introduce in-house grievance procedures
primarily to buffer themselves from normative and legal encroachment
by the outside world.' 2 Such a grievance procedure possesses both real
and symbolic value for the employer. Its real value lies in its capacity to
forestall employee litigation, bad public relations, union activism, and
other costs. Symbolically, introducing a grievance procedure demonstrates concern about fairness to the employees and the public. Equally
important, if an employee litigates, a court is likely to take the existence
of an in-house grievance procedure as evidence that no discrimination
existed or was intended. In short, the grievance procedure is intended
to deflect criticism and cool out discontent. Actually removing the
source of the grievance is at best a secondary aim.
Edelman argues that from "a substantive or class standpoint" the
correct measure of ADR programs is not, as many evaluators propose,
user satisfaction or the finality of resolutions, but whether ADR defuses
struggle, creates false consciousness, or reinforces capitalist control
over the conditions of work. This "substantive or class standpoint" is
one version of what I am calling "revisionary justice:" it focuses on the
justice of the capitalist system, not justice within the system. The reproduction of the system is the real issue. In order to measure the justice of
the system, we need a yardstick outside the system, that is, a revisionary
conception of justice.
If we employ a conception of justice within the system, we will ask
only whether voluntary non-union grievance procedures really rectify
cases of discrimination within the workplace. If the procedures really
rectify discrimination, they do justice; if not, they do not. If they do
12. See L. Edelman, Organizational Governance and Due Process: The Expansion of
Rights on the American Workplace (1985) (dissertation at Stanford University).
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justice, moreover, they will surely tend to dampen the motivation for
revising a racist or sexist based social structure by easing the shoe's
pinch. In this way, they will reproduce the existing hierarchy and thus
reproduce the injustice of the system. From the point of view of revisionary justice, they are unjust.' 3
Properly speaking, the distinction between justice within a system
and revisionary justice is not a distinction between two theories ofjustice but between two classes or families of theories ofjustice; it is a taxonomy of theories ofjustice. Marx's "from each according to his ability,
to each according to his needs"' 14 and Rawls' "difference principle" that
inequalities are just only if they make those least well-off better off are
both revisionary conceptions. Neither is tied to the existing system, and
both could be instituted only by changing that system rather drastically. 15 Nevertheless, they are clearly very different principles. Similarly, there are many possible views of justice within the systemotherwise every appellate judicial opinion would be unanimous.
As a classification scheme, the distinction between justice within the
system and revisionary justice is too crude, however. "Justice within the
system" can refer either to legal justice or to some extra-legal standard
of what the existing system implies for justice. If our criterion is legal
justice, the question we would ask about ADR programs is whether they
by-and-large approximate the "shadow verdict"-the outcome a fair
court would have decided upon less litigation costs. However, if our
criterion is extra-legal, we would ask whether ADR programs produce
outcomes that are just according to standards implicit in our institu16
tions, whether or not these standards are recognized in law.
It is also important to distinguish revisionary conceptions of what
justice ultimately requires from revisionary conceptions of what constitutes a step in the right direction. Otherwise we are left denouncing
everything short of utopia as-simply-unjust.
Marx's theory illustrates this latter distinction. According to Marx,
13. More accurately: on some views of revisionary justice they are unjust. We should
not forget that racists and sexists have their own utopian visions, disagreeable though they
are. The hallmark of a revisionary conception ofjustice is not its advocacy of progressive
social change, but its unwillingness to take any set of social constraints as a given, that is,
its insistence that even the basic structure of society is up for grabs in a discussion of
justice.
14. K. MARX, CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAM (1966).
15. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE (1971). But cf Rawls,Justice as Fairness: Political not
Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 224-25 (1985) ("[J]ustice as fairness is framed to
apply to what I have called the 'basic structure' of a modem constitutional democracy.").
It is nevertheless still true that the existing United States (for example) is unjust according
to Rawls' conception.
16. Such outcomes may be quite different from legally just outcomes: rights may be
implicit in the logic of current institutions and yet not be honored in law. For example, I
have argued that the right to legal services for people too poor to afford them is implicit in
our notion of "equal justice under law;" and yet Congress and the Supreme Court have
persistently failed to honor that right. D. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL
STUDY 243-66 (1988). Michael Walzer has argued ambitiously for many demands ofjustice
implicit in our institutions that we are far from meeting. M. WALZER, SPHERES OFJUSTICE:
A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983).
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when communism first arises it will be "in every respect, economically,
morally and intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks of the old
society from whose womb it emerges." People will not accept the revisionary principle "to each according to his needs" until "a higher phase
of communist society" has been attained, and so the principle ofjustice
17
in the "first phase" of communism is "to each according to his work."
Judged from the utopian standpoint of the higher phase, this principle is
just as flawed as its capitalist predecessor; but judged historically from
the standpoint of what counts as a step in the direction ofjustice, it is a
8
clear improvement.1
That is, a theory ofjustice also needs a theory of progress-a rank
order of states of affairs, perhaps grounded as is Marx's in a theory of
social change, according to which we can assess such ambiguous, second
or third-best achievements as the grievance programs Edelman studies.
Edelman found that such programs perpetuate the system; had she instead discovered that they stimulate employees to push for further reforms, or that the symptomatic relief afforded by the grievance
procedures was important enough to justify them, one might conclude
that they are a step toward social justice even though by a revisionary
standard they remain unjust.
This is not to say that every theory ofjustice accepts the need of a
theory of progress. Eschatologies, such as some versions of Christianity
or revolutionary Marxism, deny the possibility of a halfway point between salvation and damnation. The Book of Acts, for example, contains passages very similar in spirit to Marx's "from each according to
his ability, to each according to his needs" (indeed, Marx may have
drawn his principle from these passages). 19 In Acts, however, the principle of justice is not combined with a theory of history or of progress.
Instead, the community leaps into utopia, and the unjust are struck
dead. The Messiah cuts history in two.
The problem with all such views is that they compel us to disdain
marginal improvements, such as transforming third-best justice to second-best justice. Messianic theories regard both as injustice, with nothing more to be said. But this approach is no more useful than the Greek
philosopher Thales' startling theory that everything in the universe is
ultimately made of water. Even if you believe the theory, you still need
to distinguish the kind of water that gets poured into a glass from the
kind that is the glass. 20 Similarly, despite the messianic urge we sometimes have to denounce minor improvements as mere reformism, any
17. K. MARX, supra note 14, at 8.
18. See J. ELSTER, MAKING SENSE OF MARX, 229-30 (1985); J. ROEMER, A GENERAL
THEORY OF EXPLOITATION AND CLASS 265 (1982).
19. "The whole body of believers was united in heart and soul. Not a man of them
claimed any of his possessions in common ....They... had never a needy person among
them, because all who had property in land or houses sold it, brought the proceeds of the
sale, and laid the money at the feet of the apostles; it was then distributed to any who
stood in need." Acts 3:44-45. See also Acts 2:44-45.
20. I owe the Thales analogy to my colleague Bob Fullinwider.
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usable revisionary account ofjustice should be able to distinguish small
21
steps forward from, for example, large steps back.
These considerations are quite important in discussions of ADR, for
surely whatever virtue ADR programs possess will lie in the fact that
they are marginally better than existing alternatives-adjudication, unmediated bilateral negotiation and not in the expectation that they
achieve utopian justice. 22 To make such comparisons, we must first of
all address what I shall call the "baseline problem," by which I mean the
question of what alternative to compare ADR to. In the next section, I
examine two solutions to the baseline problem: measuring ADR against
the results of trial, and measuring ADR against the results of unmediated bilateral bargaining. These are, in effect, criteria of quality,
for they answer the question, "When is a settlement brought about via
ADR fair?" One proposal answers, "when ADR's result closely approximates that of fair adjudication." The other proposal answers "when
ADR's result approximates the settlement 'on the courthouse steps.' "
Both of these are serious and plausible solutions to the baseline problem, but I shall argue that neither one is right.
II.

THE BASELINE PROBLEM

Shadow Verdict and Shadow Bargain
Implicit in such arguments as those of Delgado, 23 Fiss, 24 and an
earlier essay of my own2 5 is the thought that ADR procedures should be
measured against the anticipated result of a trial-the so-called "shadow
verdict." After all, the reasoning runs, this is alternative dispute resolution, and adjudication is the dispute resolution process to which it is the
alternative.
This choice of the shadow verdict as baseline carries with it a significant normative freight, however, for the shadow verdict must be figured
in the light of guiding legal norms. These include both the substantive
law bearing on a dispute and the procedural devices of adversary trial
used to even the scales and move the dispute "from the realm of unilateral power into a realm of public accountability." ' 26 Anyone who thinks
21. But cf. W. BENJAMIN, Theologico-Political Fragment, in REFLECTIONS 312-13 (1978);
W. BENJAMIN, Theses on the Philosophy of Histoy, in ILLUMINArIONS 253-66 (1969). Benjamin's works contain deep and sympathetic discussions of messianic theories of history. I
discuss these in D. Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King (1989) (to be
published in volume 87 of the Michigan Law Review).
22. One might object that in fact utopian justice can be achieved, right here and right
now, through ADR. For the moment, let me beg this question; later in the paper I shall
argue explicitly for the claim I am making here.
23. Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee & Hubert, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prjudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359.
24. Fiss, supra note 2.
25. Luban, Bargainingand Compromise: Recent Work on Negotiation and InformalJustice, 14
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 397, 404 (1985).
26. Galanter, Reading the Landscapeof Disputes: What We Don't Know (and Think We Know)
About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 70 (1983). This is an
oversimplification, for appeal to the shadow verdict need not take the form described here,
in which the result is infused with legal norms abstractly (or ideally) understood. Instead it
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that legal norms possess great moral significance is likely to insist that
the shadow verdict is the only appropriate baseline against which to
measure the justice of ADR, and thus to insist that if ADR does not do a
fair job of approximating the shadow verdict it works an injustice. This
is the heart of Owen Fiss's critique of ADR. 2 7 Fiss believes that legal
norms are the public morality of our society, and worries both that ADR
will slow down the evolution of that public morality by removing disputes from the reach ofjudicial rulemaking, and that out-of-court settlements are likely to be unfair. Both criticisms measure ADR against the
shadow verdict and find it wanting.
Powerful objections have been raised to the idea that state-made
law is the public morality of society. 28 Some participants at the workshop raised a different objection: that the shadow verdict is largely irrelevant to the natural history of litigation in the real world. 29 They
pointed out that ninety percent of all cases are settled out of court; as a
consequence, the correct baseline against which to measure an ADR
procedure is not the shadow verdict but the unmediated and unsupervised negotiation in a lawyer's office or on the courthouse stepsnot the shadow verdict but the "shadow bargain," as we may call it. Proponents of this view argue further that if ADR deviates too far from the
shadow bargain, powerful disputants will lose the incentive to use ADR
procedures, since they will do better in unmediated hardball negotiation. 3 0 I argue that the shadow bargain is an unsuitable baseline for
assessing the justice of ADR procedures. 3 1 (Please note that this does
not imply that the shadow verdict is a suitable baseline-we must later
examine the possibility that the justice of ADR processes casts a shadow
of its own without standing in the shadow of anything else.)
Legal Norms and the Shadow Bargain
How does one compute the shadow bargain? It will help if we first
define the term a bit more precisely. In the same way that the shadow
verdict is the outcome of an ideally fair trial, the shadow bargain should
be understood as the outcome of an ideally fair negotiation. That
can take a "realist" form, in which the result is gotten by asking what ajudge or jury would
actually do rather than what the law would prescribe. The realist computation of the
shadow verdict will often downplay legal norms and emphasize situational factors (such as
jury bias) of the same order as those at work in a negotiation. Thus, in the Agent Orange
litigation one attorney recollected his calculations as follows: "Getting to a Brooklyn jury
with three cancers and four birth defects against seven chemical companies would have
rung the bell." See P. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE
COURT (1986). This is hardly a shadow verdict calculated according to the legal norms-a
point that proved highly relevant in assessing the fairness of the settlement.

27. Fiss, supra note 2.
28. See, e.g., Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1983); Galanter,
Justice in Many Roons, in ACCEss TO JUSTICE AND THE WELFARE STATE 147 (1981).
29. See, e.g., Honeyman, Patternsof Bias in Mediation, 1985 Mo.J. DIsPUTE RESOLUTrION

141.
30. Id. at 146.
31. 1 am therefore partially abandoning my view expressed in Luban, supra note 25, at
407-10.
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means, first, a negotiation conducted under fair rules of engagement.
These may include rules against force or fraud, structural rules such as
the various axioms assumed in formal bargaining theory, and relevant
pieces of law: contract doctrine, labor relations law, lawyers' ethical
rules, or whatever else seems appropriate. Second, the notion of
shadow bargain understood as the outcome of an ideally fair negotiation
must abstract form differences in the skill levels of the negotiators, and
indeed it assumes that both are highly skilled. However-and importantly-the shadow bargain does not abstract from disparities in bargaining power or threat advantage, for in that case all the facts of the dispute
and of the parties' situations would be filtered out, and every shadow
bargain would have the same uninteresting outcome: a fifty-fifty split.
To put it another way, the shadow bargain is the result of a fair game
between skilled players, but they are stuck with the hand they are dealt.
Thus, to figure the shadow bargain we must ask how skilled negotiators would fairly appraise the settlement value of the dispute. One
might suppose that here, as in the shadow verdict, legal norms will
enter, for it is plausible to suppose that assessing and arguing the merits
of the issue-the shadow verdict-will figure prominently in negotiating
a legal dispute. If true, this would make the shadow bargain more appealing to those (such as Fiss) for whom legal norms and legal justice
embody our collective political morality.
But it isn't true, for in negotiation the legal merits may well be
swamped by non-legal concerns, notably concern about delay if the case
isn't settled promptly. Moreover, each side must discount the worth of
the case by the probability of prevailing, and so the expected value of
the case will generally be less-often considerably less-than the
shadow verdict. To figure the shadow verdict I put myself in the position of an adjudicator (judge, juror, arbitrator) and ask myself how I
would decide the case and what it is worth. But to figure the shadow
bargain I must afterward put myself in the position of a negotiator and
ask about the likelihood that the real adjudicator will arrive at the same
outcome.
Take a concrete example, a personal injury case involving a disputed factual issue but straightforward law and undisputed damages of
$5,000. Suppose that if I were an adjudicator I would decide that the
plaintiff's factual evidence is slightly better, just above the fifty percent
required on a preponderance of evidence standard. Consequently, I
would award the plaintiff $5,000, and that is how I ought to assess the
shadow verdict. On the legal merits, then, the case is worth $5000 awarded to
the plaintiff. However, if I am a negotiator representing the plaintiff, I
must consider that by my own assessment of the evidence I have only
slightly better than a fifty percent chance of prevailing. Then the expected value of the case is just above $2,500, and that will be the shadow
bargain. For just above $2,500 is what a risk-neutral negotiator would
settle for, given that the trial is in effect a lottery with a slightly better
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than fifty percent chance of recovering $5,000 and a slightly less than
fifty percent chance of recovering nothing.
Thus, in negotiation the merits of the case enter the discussion in
the form of expected value rather than shadow verdict, and so the discrepancy between expected value and shadow verdict implies that in negotiation the legal merits may not only be swamped by extra-legal
concerns but may also become distorted.
This is all the more so because it is likely that a one-shot litigant,
such as a typical tort plaintiff, will be risk averse, while a repeat-player
litigant, such as an insurer of tort defendants, is likely to be risk neutral. 3 2 In that case, the one-shot player's shadow verdict is discounted
not only for risk but also for risk aversion.
Thus, in unmediated negotiation the shadow verdict is swamped
and doubly discounted. This means that the merits will be reflected at
best indirectly; the shadow bargain will filter out the normative concerns
reflected in the shadow verdict. 3 3 In fact, abstracting from irrational behavior and disparities in the negotiators' skills, as we must in projecting
the result of a hypothetical negotiation, the shadow bargain is determined
by just one thing: the parties' ultimate threat of walking out.
Fisher and Ury introduce the concept of the BATNA, the "best alternative to a negotiated agreement."'3 4 If the BATNA is too sparse in
comparison with some package that the parties believe to be acceptable,
35
rational parties will reach an agreement; otherwise they will not.
Thus, the outcome of a negotiation is ultimately determined solely by
the relative strength of each party's threat to walk out, to throw the
other party back on his or her BATNA.
"To Each According to His Threat Advantage"
This is why in formal bargaining theory a bargaining game is defined by just two things: a utility possibility space, that is a set, of possible agreements measured in terms of their utility to the parties, and a
threat-point, that is, a BATNA. In this respect, formal bargaining theory
32. Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change,
9 LAw & Soc'y REv. 95 (1974).
33. See Condlin, Cases on Both Sides: Patterns of Argument in Legal Dispute Negotiation, 44
MD. L. REV. 65 (1985). Condlin suggests that legal argument is often little more than a
ritual lawyers go through before turning to the dance of counter-offers that in their practice constitutes the real heart of negotiation.
To avoid misunderstanding: the fact that the shadow bargain will filter out the legal
merits, what I have called "the normative concerns reflected in the shadow verdict," is not
necessarily bad. For sometimes the law is unjust, so that an outcome accurately reflecting
the legal merits may be precisely what we do not want. In that case the shadow bargain
could be better.
34. R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WrrHouT GiVING
IN (1981).
35. It may be objected that this neglects strategic behavior undertaken to preserve or
establish a bargaining reputation. But the importance of bargaining reputation will have
already been considered by each party, both in determining whether a package is acceptable and in assessing the BATNA.
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is a good model of reality.3 6 Since the question ofjustice has been vigorously debated in formal bargaining theory, it will be useful for us to
raise the question in that context.
"This,"Jules Coleman writes, "is the Bargaining Theory 'Theory
of
Justice:' to each according to his initial advantage-or 'threat value.' "sT
To state it is to see one important objection to it: the threat-point
(BATNA) may reflect a horribly unjust initial situation, and this fact will
simply wash out if we define justice as the outcome of a bargaining
game. This is so even if fair rules are imposed on the bargaining game
itself. For example, in "a labor market with unemployment, workers
may be.agreeable to accept subhuman wages and poor terms of employment, since in the absence of a contract they may starve... [starvation is
their BATNA!], but this does not make that solution a desirable outcome in any sence (sic)." ' 8
We may illustrate this point by examining briefly the most sustained
contemporary attempt to derive a principle of distributive justice from
bargaining conducted under fair rules of engagement, that of David
Gputhier. 39 Gauthier proposes that a two-party bargain is fair if the parties concede the same proportion of their opening demands, or equivalently, receive the .same proportion of their opening demands. More
generally, a bargain with more than two parties is fair if no party receives
a smaller proportion of his or her opening demand than other parties
40
would get on alternative deals.
Formally, this proposal is the dauntingly-titled "Principle of Maximin Relative Benefit," which requires that the minimum relative benefit
that any party receives be the maximum possible. In a two-party negotiation this implies equal relative benefits. The "relative benefit" is the
proportion that a party ultimately receives of the party's opening claim
41
on the bargaining surplus.
Gauthier's idea is intuitively related to Rawls' Difference Principle:
36. The unreality of formal bargaining theories arises from additional assumptions
that are made in order to render problems mathematically tractable, for example the assumption that bargainers will entertain not merely possible agreements but lotteries
among them (convexity of the utility possibility space).
Utility is treated in this section simply as a measure of preference, not as a psychological reality ("pleasure" or "pain," "hedons," or whatever). Thus, the construction of a
utility possibility space amounts to nothing more than a description of the parties' preferences among different deals, and that means their thumbs-up and thumbs-down decisions.
But see D. GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 22-29 (1986), for a more subtle notion of
preference.
37. Coleman, Liberalism, Unfair Advantage, and AVF, in CONSCRIPTS AND VOLUNTEERS:
MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, SOCIALJUSTICE AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

109, 111 (1983)

(using the formulation of J. RAwLs, supra note 15, at 134). But cf. Barry, Don't Shoot the
Trumpeter-He's Doing His Best!, 11 THEORY & DECISION 153, 164-65 (1979), for an important caution regarding this point.
38. A. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 21 (1970).
39. See D. GAUTHIER, supra note 36. See also Gauthier, Bargaining and Justice,

2 Soc.
PHIL. & POL'Y 29 (1985). For an informal treatment see Gauthier, Bargaining Our Way into
Morality: A Do-lt-Yourself Primer, 2 PHIL. EXCHANOE 15 (1979).
40. D. GAUTHIER, supra note 36, at 154-55.
41. That is: let B represent a party's BATNA, D the party's opening demand or (in
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a bargain is fair if the party who does worst nevertheless does better
than in any other available bargain. 4 2 Nevertheless there are two
problems with Gauthier's seemingly attractive principle.
First is the problem we have just noted, that each party's outcome is
a function of threat advantage. For example, let one party's BATNA be
unilaterally increased, making it easier for him to walk out and thereby
increasing his threat advantage; let all other factors be held constant.
Then the Principle of Maximin Relative Benefit implies that the party
with the unilaterally increased BATNA will receive a larger outcome
43
than he did when his BATNA was smaller.
Second, the party that most desperately needs to make a deal will
get relatively higher utility from small payoffs than the less desperate
party, and will therefore get a higher relative benefit from a bad deal.
Thus, the Principle of Maximin Relative Benefit will typically be satisfied
by the more desperate party getting the worse deal.
For example, consider an artificial bargaining game in which Rich
and Poor are to divide $100 however they choose; if they reach no
agreement they get nothing. Since Poor needs the money badly, she will
get more utility from lower amounts than Rich. Suppose that each gets
a utility of one from the full $100; then their utilities may look some44
thing like this:
Gauthier's terminology) "claim," and S the amount for which the party finally settles. The
bargaining surplus initially claimed was D-B, so the relative benefit is (S-B)/(D-B).
In Gauthier's scheme both parties make an initial claim to the entire bargaining surplus, and the BATNA is determined by the best result each party could achieve without
cooperation (the game-theoretic equilibrium). But these additional pieces of his theory
are independent of the Principle of Maximin Relative Benefit.
Gauthier's solution is identical in the two-person case to an arbitration scheme proposed in Raiffa, Arbitration Schemes for Generalized Two-Person Games, in CoNrrRIBUrIONs TO
THE THEORY OF GAMES 11 (1953). It is Raiffa's "equitil" solution. H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND
SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 242-243 (1982).

But the two-person case is best known as the

Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. It has been axiomated in Kalai & Smorodinsky, Other Solutions
to Nash's Bargaining Problem, 43 ECONOMETRICA 513 (1975).

42. See Gauthier, Bargaining andJustice, 2 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 29 (1985).
43. This may be shown geometrically in the two-party case in a simple fashion. Connect the threat point (the point representing the two parties' BATNAs) with the claim
point (the point representing the two parties' opening demands). It is easy to show that
this line represents all possible solutions satisfying the Principle of Maximin Relative Benefit. The solution to the bargaining problem is the intersection of this line with the northeast (Pareto-optimal) frontier of the utility possibility space. A unilateral increase in a
party's BATNA will improve the party's outcome, as illustrated in Figure 1.
The other theoretically important approach to fair bargaining is that of Nash, The
BargainingProblem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950). Unilaterally increasing a party's BATNA
increases that party's outcome in the Nash solution for a large class of cases, but not for
all.
44. The numbers in this example is adapted from Coleman, supra note 37.
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Utilities

Payoffs
Rich
0
25
50
75
100

Poor
100
75
50
25
0

Rich
.00
.25
.50
.75
1.00

Poor
1.00
.98
.90
.73
.00

Minimum Relative
Benefit
.00
.25
.50
.73 (max)
.00

The maximum among these minimum relative benefits is .73,
corresponding to a distribution that gives Rich $75 and Poor $25. This,
then, is what the Principle of Maximin Relative Benefit prescribes as a
fair division. Poor's desperation leads her to settle for less.
The Poverty of Bargaining
This example illustrates a second problem with attempts, including
Gauthier's, to derive justice from bargaining, a problem that is independent of inequalities in threat advantage. Suppose we ask what is
so bad about the 75/25 split in our bargaining game. Not only does it
satisfy the Principle of Maximin Relative Benefit, but close inspection of
the table shows that Rich and Poor get fairly equal utilities (.75 and .73)
45
from such a split.
Clearly, the answer has to do with the fact that although the resultant utilities are roughly equal, the division of resources is not. There is
something manifestly unfair about a division of resources that awards
three times more to Rich than to Poor, especially since the underlying
reason is merely that Poor is more desperate! But within the vocabulary of
bargainingtheo?)-consisting,as we have seen, of nothing beyond a BATNA and
utility information, that is, information about what deals the parties prefer-this
unfairness cannot even be discussed, let alone resolved. Bargaining theory relies
impoverished to capture any
on information that is just too thin and
46
plausible pre-analytic notion ofjustice.
All that ultimately matters in the bargaining perspective is whether
a party accepts or rejects a deal, and that is equivalent to saying that
utility is all that matters. The bargaining perspective systematically
eliminates all reference to the nature of the resources that produce these
utilities, the manner in which the parties will use the resources to produce the utilities, and the features of the parties' life histories and makeups that explain the differences in their utility functions.
That is, bargaining theory is welfare sensitive or welfarist-it is interested only in utility levels. However, any plausible account of justice
must in addition be resource sensitive (resourcist)-itmust take into account
information about resources as well as utilities. 47 We can go further: it
must be utilizationsensitive, taking into account how the resources are used
45. Incidentally, it is also the Nash solution. Coleman, supra note 37, at 123.
46. See Roemer, The Mismarriageof BargainingTheory and Distributivejustice,97 ETmics 88
(1986). See also Barry, supra note 37; Scanlon, Equality of Resources and Equality of Welfare: A
ForcedMarriage?, 97 ETHmics 111 (1986).
47. See Roemer, supra note 46.
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INCREASING THE THREAT-POINT UNDER MAXIMIN RELATiVE BENEFIT

Y
R

P

Q

x
0

Figure 1

Figure 1 represents a bargaining game between X and Y. U is the utility possibility
space, representing all possible bargains between X and Y. Point a is the threatpoint or BATNA. c represents the best possible outcome for Y and Point d represents the best possible outcome for X; on the assumption that each claims his or
her best possible outcome, e is the claim-point. The points satisfying the Principle
of Maximin Relative Benefit lie on the line ae; ae intersects the Pareto frontier (arc
cd) at point P, which is therefore the solution. Point b represents a unilateral increase ofX's BATNAjust asfrepresents a unilateral increase in Y's. These result
in solutions Qand R (respectively). Since every point on line be lies to the right of
ae, and every point onfe lies above ae, Qgives player X a bigger payoff than does P,
and R gives player Y a bigger payoff than does P. This demonstrates that increased
threat-advantage yields increased payoffs.

to produce utility. Suppose that two people each lay claim to a Rembrandt painting, and suppose that they would obtain equal levels of utility from it. From a welfarist and resourcist standpoint, we cannot
distinguish their claims, for their welfare levels are equal and the resource is identical. Nevertheless, we ought to distinguish their claims if it
turns out that one of them obtains his utility by contemplating the painting's beauty, the other by locking it away, never looking at it, and en48
joying ownership of it purely because now other people envy him.
Finally, a plausible account of justice must be biography sensitive, taking
48. See Yaari & Bar-Hillel, On DividingJustly, 1 Soc. CHOICE & WELFARE 1 (1984). The
authors constructed several distribution problems involving identical resources and utilities. In one type of problem, the parties get utility from the resources because they need
them; in the second, because they have a taste for them; and in the third, because they believe
(without basis) that the resources are good for them. Yaari and Bar-Hillel presented these
problems to hundreds of subjects and discovered (not surprisingly) that the subjects opted
for radically different distributive principles in the three types of problems despite the fact
that from a welfarist or resourcist perspective the problems are identical. In my terms, this
shows that the subjects' moral intuitions are utilization sensitive.
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into account the circumstances in the parties' lives that give them the
preferences, values, and bargaining power they have.
This general point-the informational poverty of bargaining-appears to be the underlying motivation behind Fisher and Ury's theory of
principledbargaining. 49 It is simply not enough to lay claim to a share of
the bargaining surplus, appealing merely to the threat of no deal. Instead, one must offer reasons ("objective criteria") for staking that
claim. I take it that those reasons will be complex appeals to information about preferences, the intrinsic nature of the goods at issue, what
one proposes to do with those goods, and how one has gotten to the
present situation. Principled bargaining thus is at once welfare sensitive, resource sensitive, utilization sensitive and biography sensitive.
Once again, one may illustrate the problem of non-principled bargaining by examining Gauthier's account of justice. Gauthierian bargainers each make an opening demand for the entire bargaining surplus.
Why? The reason is entirely strategic: "Each person expects that what
he gets will be related to what he claims. Each wants to get as much as
possible; each therefore claims as much as possible." 50 Gauthier then
demonstrates that in purely strategic terms the parties ought to employ
the Principle of Maximin Relative Benefit. However, when he comes to
argue that justice, and not strategy alone, requires appeal to his principle, he neglects to explain why justice, and not strategy alone, permits
the parties to open negotiations by claiming the entire bargaining
surplus.
The point is that no a priori reason could be advanced for claiming
the entire bargaining surplus in all negotiations. For the bargaining surplus is a quantum of utility, of brute preference or ungrounded
"Gimme!" which is claimed independently of resource, utilization, and
biographical information. Any plausible pre-analytic conception ofjustice must be sensitive to such information. In short: the shadow bargain
represents an inappropriate baseline for assessing the justice of ADR
mechanisms.
The Shadow Bargainand Justice Within the System
One might resist this conclusion by appealing to our earlier distinction between justice within the system and revisionary justice. Threat
advantage or unequal bargaining power are, after all, facts of life, givens
of the world we live in. So is the fact that whether a deal is consummated depends ultimately on whether the parties assent to it, that is, on
the parties' preferences measured by utility-and not on information
about resources, utilization, or the parties' biographies. Within the system, that is, bargaining games really are the setting in which justice
arises or fails to arise.
Thus, a theory ofjustice within the system will ask only how to tell if
49. R.

FISHER & W. URY, supra note

50. D.

GAUTHIER,

34.

supra note 36, at 133.
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a bargain is just, given a threat point and utility information. Gauthier's
Principle of Maximin Relative Benefit is just such a principle of justice
within the system; so is Nash's solution to the bargaining problem. By
contrast, the criticisms we have just offered of the shadow bargain as a
criterion ofjustice refuse to take the threat point and utility information
as given: rather, they take the threat point and utility information to be
proper subjects for moral evaluation. This is revisionary justice.
This argument apparently leads to the conclusion that a theory of
justice within the system should accept the shadow bargain as a baseline
for assessing ADR institutions, and conversely that rejecting the shadow
bargain as a baseline presupposes some revisionary theory of justice.
But these conclusions do not follow. The argument shows only that a
theory ofjustice within the system of unmediated negotiation must take the
threat point and the bargainers' utilities as given, while a revisionary
view of the justice of unmediated negotiation will not. 5 1 It says nothing
about mediated negotiations, that is, about ADR.
Clearly ADR is an entirely different system from unmediated negotiation. The presence of the ADR professional or "neutral" adds a new
element, for the neutral has the capacity to shape the parties' preferences or utilities, to introduce many kinds of information into discussions, and perhaps even to alter the parties' perceptions of their
BATNAs. Many neutrals believe it is wrong to exercise this power, but
whether or not this is so, the mere existence of the power makes ADR a
different system and thereby transforms the question of what justice
within the system requires.
In particular, the fact that the neutral can influence utilities, agendas, and perceived threat points implies that in a mediated negotiation
these can no longer be regardedas given. In effect, moving a negotiation from
"the courthouse steps" into ADR mandates a revisionary view of the
justice of the unmediated negotiation. Thus, even justice within the system of ADR cannot rest content with the shadow bargain-the outcome
of an unmediated negotiation-as its baseline. For even if the unmediated negotiation is fair in its own terms, those terms are thrown
into question the moment a neutral enters the picture.
We are Not Here to Create Disorder, We are Here to Preserve It
Next let us consider the argument I described earlier, that if ADR
mechanisms deviate too far from the result of an unmediated negotiation then powerful disputants will have no incentive to go into ADR.
This is called the "incentives argument."
As a case in point, considerJoel Handler's description of mediators
working for the state on disputes between the parents of handicapped
children and school officials attempting to place the children in special
51. These correspond to the "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" standards of'fairness in negotiation discussed in Luban, supra note 25, at 407-10.
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education programs. 5 2 Some of these mediators attempted to inform
parents of their legal rights, see to it that they received more than perfunctory or pro forma hearings, and help them become more sophisticated and knowledgeable about dealing with the bureaucracy. In this
way the mediators pushed the disputants away from the shadow bargain
in the direction of outcomes that were more satisfactory to the parents
but less satisfactory to the officials. Here the bureaucracy could not walk
away from the mediators, although the incentives were certainly there;
but the actual outcome effectively demonstrates the point of the incentives argument: the mediators lost their jobs. If Mohammed can't walk
away from the mountain, he gets the mountain fired.
Some workshop participants (Bellman and Honeyman) suggested
that the mediators were fired because they had abandoned their neutrality, their mediative role, by intervening on the side of the parents. Their
view is shared by many ADR professionals, but it is far from unanimous.
Thus, Albie Davis and Richard Salem tell mediators confronting a power
imbalance to "compensate for low-level negotiating skills," to "interrupt
intimidating negotiating patterns," to "watch to see that one party does
not settle out of fear of violence or retaliation," and, ultimately, "[i]f the
mediator has exhausted available techniques for balancing power and
the imbalance persists and is undermining the basic objectives of mediation, the mediator should consider terminating the session."'5 3 In the
same vein Standard IV(A) of the Mediation Council of Illinois Professional Standards of Practice for Mediators insists that "[i]mpartiality is
not the same as neutrality in questions of fairness,'" 54 and the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts ("AFCC") Model Standards assert that "[t]he mediator has a responsibility to maintain impartiality
while raising questions for the parties to consider as to the fairness, equity, and feasibility of proposed options for settlement." 55
This difference in views has ignited a highly divisive and polemical
debate among ADR professionals about their professional responsibility, which surfaced in the Society of Professionals In Dispute Resolutions ("SPIDR") deliberations over its code of ethics. Some believe that
a mediator should intervene on behalf of the underdog if the other party
attempts to strong arm a favorable settlement by raw exercise of threat
advantage or bargaining power; others believe that such intervention is
unethical, reflecting merely a "bias of social reform" on the part of the
56
neutral.
The incentives argument is an attempt to buttress the anti-interven52. J. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY, BUREAU-

CRACY (1986).
53. Davis & Salem, Dealing with PowerImbalances in the Mediation of InterpersonalDisputes,
6 MEDIATION Q. 17, 25 (1'984).
54. THE MEDIATION COUNCIL OF ILLINOIS PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR
MEDIATORS, reprintedin Schneider, MEDIATION Q. 83, 92 (June 1985).
55. ASSOCIATION OF FAMILY AND CONCILLIATION COURTS (AFCC) MODEL STANDARDS,

reprintedin Milne, Model Standards ofPracticefor Family and Divorce Mediation, 8 MEDIATION
73, 76 (June 1985).
56. Honeyman, Bias and Mediators' Ethics, 2 NEGOTIATION J. 175 (1986).

Q.
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tion side of this debate. It stresses that consistently favoring "have
nots" will simply lead "haves" to avoid ADR. Then unmediated bargains will rule the roost, and the haves will enjoy free play for their
threat advantage.
In line with the incentives argument, Honeyman defends the cynical
definition of a mediator as "someone who listens to and reasons politely
with both parties only until he is sure which is weaker, and then jumps
on that one with both feet" as follows: "Pressing the weaker party at
what is aptly called 'crunch' time is not evidence of bias, because it is
necessary to recognize differences in power. If mediators ignored the
'real world' and attempted to base all settlements on reason and brothwould obtain little benefit from mediation and
erly love, stronger parties
''5 7
would soon avoid it.
If the incentives argument is right, it is a powerful one. But there is
an equally powerful reply: if mediation simply gives powerful parties
everything they can obtain without it, what is the point of mediation? At
this point ADR professionals begin to resemble the Chicago police in
1968 as Mayor Daley described them: "The police are not here to create
disorder, they are here to preserve it." Indeed, if the cynic's definition
of the mediator has any truth to it-and I fear that it does-the weaker
party does worse in mediation than outside of it, because now the mediator and the stronger party are ganging up on him or her to expedite the
settlement.
The Modified Incentives Argument
There is also reason to believe that the incentives argument is only
partially correct. Some ADR programs are compulsory rather than optional, in which case the argument does not apply, since the stronger
party cannot walk away. Others, though not compulsory, are part of
some agency's standard operating procedure. Still others, such as mediation or summary jury trial undertaken by litigants at a judge's request,
will be hard to refuse, since neither party wants to risk antagonizing the
judge.
More importantly, in some cases the stronger party does worse in
ADR than in unmediated negotiation simply because during the course
of ADR he has been brought to see that his adversary really has a valid
point. When that happens, he is unlikely to come away harboring suspicions that the ADR process has served him badly. The incentives argument seems curiously oblivious to this possibility-"curiously" because
such evolution in a party's outlook (from adversarial truculence, to
grudging acknowledgment of the adversary's point of view, to genuine
cooperation) is in a sense the entire point of ADR at its best.
Finally, a stronger party who refuses ADR must consider the risk
that a dispute will end up being tried rather than settled. The very act of
refusing ADR might increase that risk by angering the other party-"He
57. Honeyman, supra note 29, at 146.
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won't go into mediation with me? The hell with him! We'll go to
trial!"-but even if this doesn't happen the risk of no settlement will
often be substantial.
And provided that litigation costs and risks are high enough, powerful parties may find ADR in their best interests even if mediators intervene on behalf of the weaker parties to bring about a fairer outcome. In

strictly economic terms, it is rational for the powerful party to participate in ADR provided her marginal expected cost of refusing ADR and
thereby upping risk of trial exceeds her marginal expected loss of ADR
relative to unmediated settlement. After all, even without mediation insurers, for example, settle nuisance suits even though they could probably mount a successful defense, simply because it isn not worth the
effort. Presumably a powerful party who is willing to sustain a certain
amount of bite from parasites would be just as willing to pay a claim
when he discovers through the mediation process that it is actually fair.
Many people would rather pay fair settlements than legal fees.
To illustrate, let us take a dispute that the stronger party defending
a suit for damages could settle for $2,000 in unmediated hardball negotiation, because it is painful for the weaker party to tolerate delay. Suppose that the probability of the weaker party going to trial rather than
accepting a $2,000 settlement is close to zero: two thousand dollars is
the shadow bargain. If the case does go to trial, there is a fifty percent
chance that the stronger party will lose, and a jury will probably bring in
a judgment of $60,000. Moreover, the stronger party's additional legal
fees entailed by trial will amount to $5,000.
The judge suggests bringing in a mediator, and the stronger party
estimates that if he refuses, the probability that the weaker party will
become angry and insist on trial even though doing so is economically
painful goes up from zero to ten percent. Thus the probability of
achieving the $2,000 out-of-court settlement drops to ninety percent.
For simplicity we will suppose that the stronger party's legal fees are the
same whether the case is settled by unmediated negotiation or by mediation, so that mediation entails no increase in legal fees. 58 The expected
value of refusing mediation is thus:
.10 x .50 x $60,000 (judgment)
+ .10 x
$ 5,000 (added legal fees)
+ .90 x
$ 2,000 (settlement)
=

$5,300

If the mediation produces any settlement less than $5,300 to the
plaintiff, therefore, it is economically rational for the defendant to go
into mediation, because the marginal expected cost of refusing
mediation is greater than the marginal loss of mediation. The incentives
argument said that it is rational for the stronger party to avoid
mediation whenever the mediation produces a settlement in which the
58. Dropping this assumption does not affect our conclusions, it just makes for more
numbers.
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stronger party pays more than the shadow bargain ($2,000). We now
see that even in strictly economic terms the argument must be modified.
This last point suggests, however, that a qualified form of the
incentives argument will be valid. Whenever participation in ADR is
completely optional, whenever powerful parties do worse than the
shadow bargain in ADR for reasons other than fully voluntary
concession, and whenever their marginal expected loss in ADR relative
to the shadow bargain exceeds their marginal expected loss of refusing
ADR, then they will have an incentive to avoid ADR. Let us call this the
"modified incentives argument." It is simply the original incentives
argument qualified by the three "whenevers." It will figure in our
subsequent discussion, for it sets an upper limit to the extent
redistributive social reform can be pursued through the. use of ADR.
The Shadow Verdict
All these arguments point to the conclusion that the shadow bargain cannot be taken as the normative baseline for assessing ADR programs. ADR programs must be held to a standard ofjustice that is less
dependent on the brute bargaining power of the parties and more sensitive to morally relevant information.
This is not to say, however, that the shadow verdict-the anticipated
result of a fair trial-is a better standard ofjustice. That would be true
only if we are speaking of legal justice, and then it is true tautologically.
We have seen that legal justice is only one of at least four conceptions of
justice, and perhaps not the most important of the four. On any of the
other three conceptions of justice-extra-legal justice, ideal justice, or
second-best justice-the shadow verdict carries decisive normative
weight only when the law is itselfjust, both in general and in the case at
hand.
An example is the settlement of the Agent Orange class action,
brought by exposed Vietnam veterans against seven chemical companies
that manufactured Agent Orange. Scant hours before trial was scheduled to begin, the case was settled for $180 million in a weekend bargaining session conducted by Judge Jack Weinstein and two special
masters.
The case was a tricky one. If it ever got to ajury it was pretty clear
that the defendants would lose a lot of money. However, it was unclear
to the lawyers whether the plaintiffs' causation evidence was good
enough to take to a jury. To prove by a preponderance of evidence that
any individual veteran's cancer had been caused by Agent Orange, the
cancer rate among the veterans would have to be more than twice the
rate in the general population, which was not the case. Thus, even if the
cancer rate among veterans was significantly higher than the background cancer rate, the veterans might lose on summary judgment.5 9
59. On this evidentiary problem with Agent Orange see P. SCHUCK, supra note 26, at
185-86.
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Many of us think, however, that this simply shows that the preponderance-of-evidence requirement is unreasonably demanding in cases of
statistical causation such as Agent Orange. If you believe this, you must
also believe that the settlement, in which the plaintiffs got $180 million,
is much more just than an adjudication in which they would receive
nothing. The settlement resulted, moreover, because the defendants
thought trial was too risky-the expected value for the defendants was
much worse than the shadow verdict. That is, for precisely the reasons
we have discussed, the bargain did not reflect the legal norms. Nevertheless, in this case the bargain was preferable to the shadow verdict.
Nor did the Agent Orange settlement approximate the shadow bargain, the result the parties would have reached negotiating without
assistance. First of all, it is unclear that there was a shadow bargain.
Without Weinstein's ADR intervention, it is clear that the case would
have gone to trial. Second, we will find it virtually impossible to estimate the shadow bargain even on the assumption that the parties would
have settled during the trial. Left to their own devices, a week before
the settlement they were still a quarter of a billion dollars apart! Finally,
during the weekend bargaining session the two sides were on the verge
of agreeing to $200 million, but Weinstein forced it down to $180 mil60
lion because he thought the higher number unfair.
Let us leave to one side whether Weinstein was right. The point is
that through ADR he was attempting to fashion a fair and just outcome
that was not tailored to either the shadow bargain or the shadow verdict.
That, after all, is the initial claim made by the quality argument-that
the "give a little, take a little settlement" is higher quality justice than
the all-or-nothing adjudication. Perhaps the standard ofjustice in ADR
lies in its creative capacity to bring disputants to solutions that are
modeled on neither law nor bargaining power. 6 1 But what standard is
that?

III. QUALITY
Four Criteriaof Quality
Participants at the workshop suggested four criteria of quality of
justice in ADR. The first three are:
(A) participant satisfaction,
(B) the furthering of social justice, and
(C) the transformation of the parties.
The root idea of criterion (C) was well described by Lon Fuller in a classic article. The central quality of mediation is "its capacity to reorient
the parties toward each other, not by imposing rules on them, but by
helping them to achieve a new and shared perception of their relationship, a perception that will redirect their attitudes and dispositions to60. Id. at 159.
61. See Menkel-Meadow, TowardAnother View ofLegal Negotiation: The Structureof Problem
Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754 (1984).
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'6 2
ward one another."
The transformation of the parties actually means one of two rather
different things. On the one hand, it can mean empowering the parties
so that they are able to participate more actively and constructively in
the relationship and exercise more control. Often this means educating,
boosting, or otherwise supporting the weaker-less articulate, less selfconfident, more oppressed-party. Empowerment, therefore, involves a
redistribution of political control.
On the other hand, the transformation of the participants can mean
restructuring or reconstituting their relationships-getting them to acknowledge each others' points of view, encouraging them to see each
other as flesh-and-blood people without tails or horns, and transforming
"I/It" relationships to "I/Thou" relationships. In short, we may
subdivide criterion (C) into criteria (CI) empowerment and (C2)
reconciliation.
It is tempting to play the role of the pluralist at this point. All four
of these criteria look good; why not say that the quality of justice is a
combination, perhaps a weighted sum, of all of them? I believe, however, that one should resist the allure of syncretism as long as possible.
This is partly for theoretical parsimony (hypotheses are at their most
fruitful when they don't multiply!), but the more important reason is that
several of these criteria are responses to what appear to be conflicting
visions of the human good. This makes them at least prima fade
competitors.
Thus, on one reading of participant satisfaction the criterion seems
motivated by a broadly utilitarian, or, alternatively, therapeutic world
view. In fact, several workshop participants suggested that the quality of
ADR is indexed by whether participants "feel good about the process."
Proponents of reconciliation draw inspiration from communitarian social thought 63 or religious conceptions of community.64 And empowerment will seem crucial to those whose conception of the human good
stresses autonomy, self-reliance, or, alternatively, dealienated political
participation.
The pursuit of social justice does not, at first blush, entail commitment to a particular view of the human good, for as we have seen in
Section I "justice" can mean many things, and, even when one meaning
is fixed, alternative theories ofjustice will always exist. It is reasonably
clear, however, that the pursuit of social justice through ADR arises
within the larger movement of left wing politics that has made social
justice its explicit aim. Commentators who stress the importance of social justice mean to connect ADR with the larger movement. Such politics itself has utilitarian, therapeutic, communitarian, and proparticipatory strands. It is a mistake, however, to equate the pursuit of

62.
63.
the Law
64.

Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 325 (1971).
See, e.g., Bush, Between Two Worlds: The Shift From Individualto Group Responsibility in
of Causation of Injury, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1473, 1532-63 (1986).
See, e.g., McThenia & Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE LJ. 1660 (1985).
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social justice to these other visions of the human good. Those who emphasize social justice typically insist that in an unjust society, community
and participation are merely illusory, utility and healing merely provisional and co-optive.
Thus, there does seem to be a distinctive form of the human good
associated with the pursuit of social justice. It is one that stresses our
status as moral beings possessing distinctively moral interests. One
thinks here of Rawls' assertion that justice is the first virtue of social
institutions, or Brecht's poem "The Bread of the People:"' 65
Justice is the bread of the people.
Sometimes it is plentiful, sometimes it is scarce.
Sometimes it tastes good, sometimes it tastes bad.
When the bread is scarce, there is hunger.
When the bread is bad, there is discontent ....
If the bread is good and plentiful
The rest of the meal can be excused.
One cannot have plenty of everything all at once.
Nourished by the bread of justice
The work can be achieved
From which plenty comes.
As daily bread is necessary
So is daily justice.
It is even necessary several times a day.
Let me comment briefly on each of these criteria. I shall argue that,
of the four, participant satisfaction is the only untenable criterion ofjustice for ADR. The other three are important and tenable alternatives.
My cautionary remarks about them are intended not as criticism, but
only to point out complexities that their proponents must address. I will
suggest that although social justice is of vital importance we should not
expect ADR to figure prominently in achieving it, that empowerment
may be difficult to identify in a non-circular manner, and that the goal of
reconciliation among the parties may have to be understood in a rather
66
narrow fashion.
ParticipantSatisfaction
The most obvious and attractive criterion of quality ofjustice is the
satisfaction of the participants. Its rationale takes several forms. The
first is straightforward utilitarianism: the aim of social institutions in
general, and institutions of justice including ADR in particular, is the
maximization of utility. Judge Richard Enslen recommended that summary jury trials be assessed by exit questionnaires asking litigants how
satisfied they were with the process. This, I take it, makes sense on a
utilitarian rationale.
65.

B. BRECHT, POEMS 1913-1956 (1976).

66. Let me stress that the judgments of ADR advanced here are generally intended as
absolute, not comparative, judgments. That is, when I argue that ADR is not an especially
promising vehicle for the pursuit of social change, I do not intend to suggest that its alternatives-adjudication or unmediated bargaining-are any better.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 66:3

Furthermore, commercial providers of ADR services depend upon
satisfied consumers for their livelihood. The market will register consumer preferences. Therefore, any market-oriented approach to assessing ADR will necessarily focus on participant satisfaction as its ultimate
benchmark.
Finally, ADR practitioners with a background in social work or therapy stress the importance of ADR techniques as a way for people to deal
with complex feelings, particularly anger and resentment aroused by a
dispute. While nobody thinks mediation is group therapy, several workshop participants invoked therapeutic criteria. Not participant satisfaction, but participant subjective feelings, become the measure of success.
I believe, however, that participant satisfaction is an unacceptable
criterion of quality of justice for four fundamental reasons: externality
problems, sour-grapes phenomena (so-called "adaptive preference formation") 6 7 induced by attorneys cooling out their clients, distributional
insensitivity, and informational poverty. Let me explain these in turn.
Externality problems
Robert Gorske described the successful resolution of a multi-million dollar dispute between the Wisconsin Electric Power Company and
American Can Company through a mini-trial procedure proposed by
Endispute, Inc. The terms of the settlement were confidential, and this
fact led Stewart Macaulay to worry that no outside check existed to ensure that the terms were beneficial to electric power consumers a regulated utility. In general, Macaulay believes, an ADR process may well
succeed because the participants are able to pass the losses and downside risks on to third parties.
Consider a typical "nimby" or not in my back yard problem of a sort
familiar to environmental mediators. 68 A hospital plans to build a halfway house for convalescent schizophrenics in a well-to-do neighborhood. The neighborhood's residents object and initiate legal action to
prevent the construction. The hospital persists. The mayor sends in a
mediator, and the disputants solve their problem by the hospital agreeing to erect the halfway house in a poor neighborhood instead. The
poor neighborhood's residents find out about it in the newspaper; they
do not complain because they believe that complaining will be unsuccessful. Here, the primary disputants have achieved a satisfactory outcome only by displacing the negative externality onto an uninvolved and
unrepresented party.
67. See Elster, Sour Grapes-Utilitarianismand the Genesis of Wants, in UTILITARIANISM AND
BEYOND 219 (1982).
68. See A. TALBOT, SETrLING THINGS: SIX CASE STUDIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION (1983). In Settling Things, the author discusses a nimby problem mediated by Howard

Bellman. My hypothetical is based on a current dispute in Washington, D.C. over attempts
by the District government to build halfway houses in Georgetown, the District's most
affluent neighborhood. A Georgetown citizen group is attempting to prevent the plan by
taking legal action. I do not mean to imply that the real-life dispute will proceed along the
lines of my hypothetical, however.
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The point of such examples is that as long as negative externalities
can result from ADR proceedings, the satisfaction of the participantswill
not be an adequate measure ofjustice. In the familiar language of the
economic analysis of externalities: the private costs of the negotiated
solution do not reflect its true social cost.
Similar externality problems arise on the therapeutic version of participant satisfaction. As William Simon argues, lawyers who view their
representation of clients on the therapeutic model-what he calls the
model of "homo psychologicus"-typically regard the lawyer-client relationship as a "community of two" for which the rest of the world consists of adversaries to be neutralized. 69 This world view is surely an
invitation to solve the problems of the community of two by passing
them along in the form of externalities.
The same criticisms will clearly apply to a neutral who views herself
together with the disputants as a "community of three." Precisely such
an attitude is reflected in SPIDR's ethical standard entitled "Unrepresented Interests," which reads: "[t]he neutral must consider circumstances where interests are not represented in the process. The neutral
has an obligation, where in his or her judgment the needs of the parties
dictate, to assure that such interests have been carefully considered by
'70
the principal parties."
Notwithstanding the strong-sounding "must" and "has an obligation" language, the rule is squarely within the community-of-three tradition. The first sentence obliges the neutral merely to think about
unrepresented interests; the second sentence obliges the neutral-but
only when "the needs of the parties dictate," which they presumably do
not in our nimby example-to make sure that the parties also think
about unrepresented interests. The rule gives no indication what the
neutral or the parties ought to think about unrepresented interests, or
how they ought to think about them, or what they ought to do after they
have thought about them. The view here is clearly that though externality problems are troubling, they must be subordinated to the needs and
interests of the primary disputants.
Sour grapes and cooling out.
The second problem with taking participant satisfaction as a criterion ofjustice is simple to state. Participants are not necessarily satisfied
because the process has been a good one; they can be satisfied simply
because their expectations have been illegitimately lowered. Attorneys
interested in facilitating a settlement are great client-expectation lowerers: it is-well known that a crucial part of settling a case involves cooling
out one's client by overstressing the risks of litigation. 7 1 The result is
69. See Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REV. 487

(1980).
70.

SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN DIsPuTE RESOLUTION, ETHICAL STANDARDS

(1987).
71. See, e.g., D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974).
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what Jon Elster calls "adaptive preference formation," as typified in the
phenomenon of sour grapes: one adapts one's preferences to the possibility of satisfying them. What you cannot have, you do not want. If
your lawyer tells you that the case is worth a maximum of $3,000 you
will be satisfied to settle for that amount.
On Elster's analysis, which I endorse, the phenomenon of adaptive
preference formation spells trouble for utilitarianism-and Elster's criticism applies squarely to judging ADR procedures by participant
satisfaction:
[W]hy should individual want satisfaction to be the criterion of
justice . . . if people tend to adjust their aspirations to their
possibilities? For the utilitarian, there would be no welfare loss
if the fox were excluded from consumption of the grapes, since
he thought them sour anyway. But of course the cause of his
holding the grapes to be sour was his conviction that he would
be excluded from consumption of them, and then it is difficult
72
to justify the allocation by reference to his preferences.
The motivations for attorneys to cool out their clients are clear: if a
dispute goes to trial there will be a loser, and no attorney wants to lose.
It is bad for the ego, bad for the pocketbook, bad for the reputation, and
bad for business. Federal Judge H. Lee Sarokin has remarked that asking attorneys if they want his help in settling a case is like asking a
drowning man if he wants a life preserver. Moreover, as Rosenthal argues, it is in attorneys' financial interest to settle cases sooner rather
than later, for the marginal costs of preparing for trial inevitably rise
more rapidly than the marginal benefit in increased settlement and
(therefore) contingency fee.
As long as attorneys cool out clients, therefore, worry about adaptive preference formation should lead us to suspect participant satisfaction as a criterion of justice. Even if the ADR procedure does not
involve attorneys, it will often be that the mediator brings home the settlement by damping down the disputants' expectations.
Distributional insensitivity
Participant satisfaction is also subject to the usual criticisms of utilitarianism for its nonchalance about how satisfaction is distributed
among the parties. Even Pareto-improvements-bargains in which at
least one party gains and nobody loses-may be suspect.
For example, Judge Susan Steingass remarked that in a divorce mediation the ideal settlement is one that both parties can live with but
neither party is happy with. If one party leaves the mediation smiling, it
is time to worry. In line with this, we may consider two imaginary mediations. In the first, both parties leave in the condition Steingass describes: they can live with the outcome, but they find it essentially
mediocre. In the second, only one party finds it essentially mediocre but
bearable, while the other party is completely delighted. The second me72. Elster, supra note 67.
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diation is a Pareto-improvement over the first, and exit questionnaires
will register more gross participant satisfaction in the second. However,
we are certainly entitled to suspect that in the second mediation someone got skinned.
Informational poverty
The last worry about participant satisfaction is simply a reprise of
our earlier discussion of bargaining: any plausible criterion of justice
must be sensitive to information about resources, their utilization, and
the lives of the participants, not just information about welfare. But participant satisfaction is a purely welfarist measure.
It may be objected to this entire line of criticism that we have misunderstood and trivialized participant satisfaction by viewing it along
utilitarian, or therapeutic, or generally "feel good" lines. Participant
satisfaction is not valued for its own sake, but for the sake of whatever it
is the participants feel good about. For most likely what the participants
feel good about is the justice of the procedure.
That is, participant satisfaction need not be subjective or inward
looking. It can be satisfaction that they got a fair hearing, that the neutral was helpful and constructive in fashioning a solution, that they,
73
rather than their lawyers, controlled the process, and so on.
In that case, however, participant satisfaction is not the criterion of
justice at all: fairness, correct outcomes, empowerment and party-control are the criteria. Participant satisfaction is invoked here simply as
evidence that these criteria are satisfied. However, it is not decisive evidence, because the participants may have been bamboozled into believing that the neutral was fair or constructive when in fact a savvy observer
could see otherwise. Thus, participant satisfaction must either be understood on welfarist lines, in which case our objections to it stand, or
else it must be understood as a proxy for some other criterion of quality,
in which case we should not be looking at participant satisfaction.
SocalJustice
Social justice is an ambiguous criterion of quality in ADR for reasons we have already elaborated on. "Social justice" can refer to legal
justice or to getting what the system implicitly promises. Both of these
are conceptions of justice within the system. "Social justice" can also
refer to progress or to ideal justice. Both of these are revisionary conceptions ofjustice.
Earlier I argued that the better an ADR regime is at providingjustice within the system, the better it will be at eliminating incentives to
work for the global system change demanded by revisionary justice.
This suggests that if social justice is understood along revisionary lines
only an ineffective ADR regime will facilitate the pursuit of social justice!
One can hardly come right out and propose making ADR regimes inef73. This argument was suggested to me by Marc Galanter.
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fective. Thus, anyone who is committed to pursuing revisionary justice
through ADR will have to do so by secretly subverting the process in
order to raise the temperature of disputes so the weaker participants
press for more global social change.
This may not be so improbable a scenario. Handler's cautionary
tale about the mediators in school-placement disputes described their
aims as: informing the parents of their legal rights even though the bureaucracy wanted to keep them uninformed, empowering them, making
them better negotiators, and slowing down the bureaucracy in its attempt to facilitate fast, perfunctory hearings. The clear outcome of such
interventions is that the parents become feistier, more skeptical, and
more demanding. This will lead to more disputes, not fewer disputes,
and it is hard to imagine that the mediators were not perfectly well
aware of this. My uninformed guess is that they aimed to create problems
for the bureaucracy that would force it to reform itself.
This amounts to the neutral providing the weaker parties with
glimpses of greener grass on the other side of the fence so that they
become discontent with the fence. Elster terms this "counteradaptive
preference formation." "The grass is greener on the other side of the
fence" is, after all, the mirror image of sour grapes. Elster adds: "Iflor
the record, it may well be adaptive in some larger sense to have counteradaptive preferences, because of the incentive effects created by a moving target."'74 That may be how ADR effects widespread revisionary
social change.
The objection to such a program is simply that it is paternalistic and
manipulative. The neutral will have to disguise her real aims (empowerment, counteradaptive preference formation), or whatever from the participants-who will often be paying clients-and perhaps even from
herself (since few of us are able to live successfully in the role of double
agent). Surely this is not a viable or stable self-image for ADR.
There is one other way in which ADR can contribute to revisionary
justice. Occasionally a revisionary or even utopian principle of justice
may be satisfied within the context of a single mediation. A lucky and
skillfully-conducted mediation might actually end in both parties giving
according to their abilities and receiving according to their needs. For
this to happen the Fullerian transformation of the parties' relationship
must be astonishingly deep, for they will be resolving their dispute in a
way that is far removed from the materials that are ready to hand in our
culture. (A revisionary principle of justice is by definition a principle
that is not business as usual within our culture.) The ADR session will
be little less than an intimation of utopia. However, such ADR epiphanies are bound to be rare, as rare as great sex or perfect friendship.
They will surely not be ADR as usual. While we must take note of their
possibility, we should not get our hopes up that mediation can bring a
74. Elster, supra note 67.
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better, brighter world into existence before our very eyes, one dispute at
a time.
ADR is likely to be better at helping realize justice within the system
than revisionary justice. If legal justice is the aim, then ADR may well
come close to the shadow verdict, at lower costs and with greater expeditiousness than the trial process. This is the efficiency argument that is
most commonly made on behalf of ADR. Nevertheless ADR's real
strength may lie in pursuing extra-legal justice within the system, and
that is an argument based on quality, not efficiency. Recall that "extralegal justice within the system" refers to goods or rights that are implicit
in existing institutions but to which we have no legal right. Here we
need no intimations of utopia; here the cultural materials for discussion
and negotiation are already in place, in the form of existing institutions
and their logic.
Imagine, for example, an employment discrimination suit in which
the law almost certainly grants the plaintiffs no remedy even though
their grievance is real. A good mediator may well help the disputants
achieve a consent decree in which the defendant establishes an affirmative action program to which the plaintiffs had no legal entitlement, just
because it seems as though the time is ripe for such a program. The fact
that the logic of existing institutions is on the side of the plaintiffs may
well lead the defendant to look favorably on a compromise.
In ADR, that is, parties can come to accept the qualified validity of
each others' viewpoints and grant concessions that go beyond legal entitlements, because those concessions are already inherent in shared principles and existing institutions. This is the reason why "the absolute
result of a trial is not as high a quality ofjustice as the freely negotiated,
give a little, take a little settlement" 75-our opening statement of the
quality argument.
It is important to realize, however, that ADR's contribution to social
change will be modest. Earlier we considered the "incentives argument" that if parties with bargaining advantages do not do as well in
ADR as in unmediated negotiation they will avoid ADR. We saw that as
long as the added concessions they make in ADR are less than the marginal increase in expected legal fees or litigation costs that result from
avoiding ADR, strong parties will still have an incentive to use ADR.
This was our "modified incentives argument." However, this sets an
upper limit on how much extra-legal social justice ADR can provide:
sooner or later strong parties will look to the bottom line, and then they
will give away legal entitlements only to the point where the marginal
cost of the giveaway equals the marginal cost of insisting on their legal
rights. This gives some latitude for the realization of extra-legal justice
within the system-but not much.
Some critics of ADR take an even dimmer view of the matter, arguing that ADR is an enemy of progressive social reform. In Mark Lazer75. Galanter, supra note 5.
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son's essay In the Halls ofJustice, the Only Justice is in the Halls,76 and Jerold
Auerbach's book Justice Without Law?77 we find arguments that ADR is an
almost conspiratorial backdoor attempt to take back formal legal rights
won by have-nots after arduous political struggles. Other authors in
Abel's anthology accuse the ADR movement of establishing a two-tier
justice system-the rich get trials and the poor get mediators-or treating disputants as "a commodity from which various professionals and
'7 8
entrepreneurs extract a profit."
Lazerson describes an ingenious campaign by South Bronx legal
services lawyers to tie slum landlords in knots by skillful use of timeconsuming legal formalities as the landlords sought to evict poor tenants. Only after this tactic succeeded were the landlords ready to negotiate with their tenants. The landlords retaliated by lobbying for the
creation of an ADR process-an informal housing court-which in practice simply gave poor tenants the bum's rush into quick evictions. The
informal housing court undid the formal legal victories of the legal serv79
ices lawyers.
However, this example cannot be generalized to a wholesale critique of informalism. As William Simon points out, the tenants were
able to exploit the formal legal system only because the burden of initiative in seeking evictions rested on the landlords-the landlords could be
tied in knots by delay because they needed a court order to evict.
Change the law so that the burden rests on the tenants-say, by permitting landlord self-help, with the tenants needing a court order to prevent eviction-and the formal system would benefit the landlords, while
a faster ADR procedure would benefit the tenants.8 0
The point of Simon's discussion is to suggest that whether ADR or
the formal system better protects hard-won rights of have-nots depends
on context, not on innate properties of ADR or the formal system.
Thus, contrary to the critics, no general story can be told about whether
ADR will help or hurt have-nots. Clearly the effects of ADR on women,
minorities, or poor people is a matter for empirical investigation and not
a priori argument, as Delgado, Finley, and Wilkins stressed in their
presentations, which pointed to problem areas in which empirical investigation is urgently needed. 8 ' In any event, it will probably be true that
76. Lazerson, supra note 1.
77. J. AUERBACH, supra note 1.
78. See, e.g., Scull, Community Corrections: Panacea, Process, or Pretense?, in THE POLITICS
OF INFORMALJUSTICE 105 (1982).
79. Lazerson, supra note 1.
80. Simon, Legal Informality and Redistributive Politics, CLEARINGHOUSE REV., Summer
1985, at 384-91.
81. See also Lerman, supra note 1. Critics also suggest that ADR amounts to a two-tier
justice system, with haves monopolizing the courts while have-nots get the mediators.
Thus, Auerbach writes: "Bar associations do not recommend that corporate law firms divert their clients to mediation." J. AUERBACH, supra note 1, at 144. See also THE POLITICS OF
INFORMAL JUSTICE 78 (R. Abel ed. 1982). But Gorske's example of the dispute between
American Can and Wisconsin Electric Power, and the practice of organizations such as
Endispute or the Center for Public Resources suggests that Auerbach is wrong.
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ADR can, at best, represent a marginal contribution to the pursuit of
social justice in either its within-the-system or revisionary forms.
Empowerment
"Empowerment" has been defined as "giving assistance to one of
the parties so that both parties have equally valued input into the decision-making process of mediation." 82 As I have indicated, it is a matter
of considerable controversy among the ADR professions whether empowerment is ethically commanded or ethically forbidden to the neutral.
Without addressing that question, we may still consider the possibility
that empowerment is a criterion of quality in ADR.
An initial objection to an empowerment theory of quality is that it
focuses exclusively on process rather than outcome: as long as "both
parties have equally valued input into the decision-making process" they
are empowered, but the outcome may still be relentlessly lopsided or
otherwise unappealing. True, empowerment of the weaker party will be
necessary to prevent a mere contest of bargaining strength, but empowerment may still not be sufficient for justice.
But this objection is not decisive, for it begs the question of what
justice is. For on some accounts the outcome of a discussion in which
both parties have equally valued input, because coercive and hierarchical structures have been provisionally neutralized, isjustice.83Such a view
has been defended most elaborately by Jfirgen Habermas.
According to Habermas, discussions are typically distorted by imbalances in power, by social class, by neurosis, and by ideologically-induced false consciousness. However, implicit in any discussion, no
matter how distorted, is the "ideal speech situation" in which all these
constraints are removed and in which "participants, themes and contributions are not restricted except with reference to the goal;.., no force
except that of the better argument is exercised; and ... as a result, all4
'8
motives except that of the cooperative search for truth are excluded."
Habermas argues that valid norms (for example, of justice) simply are
the outcome of such a discussion, that we mean nothing more by the
notions of validity and truth than "whatever we would reach consensus
on in an ideal speech situation"-the so-called "consensus theory of
85
truth."

It seems fairly clear that an empowerment theory of quality makes
sense only on a theory of justice in which just outcomes are defined in
terms of ideal process. Habermas's theory is not without its difficulties,
82. Engram & Markowitz, supra note 10, at 23.
83. J. HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (1975); J. HABERMAS & N.
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Habermas, Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence, 13 INQUIRY 360 (1970). See also R.
GEUSs, THE IDEA OF A CRITICAL THEORY (1981).
84. J. HABERMAS, supra note 83, at 107-08.
85. J. HABERMAS & N. LUHMANN, supra note 83, at 123-36. See also R. GEUSS, supranote
83, at 65-67.
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but many of these pertain to portions of the theory that are of no concern to us.8 6 The idea that justice in ADR should be measured against a
Habermasian standard of the projected outcome of an ideal speech situation, and the related suggestion that a neutral should try to bring about
an ideal speech situation by empowerment, are clearly very attractive.
The real difficulty with such a view is not its theoretical adequacy
but its practical meaningfulness. Once we acknowledge, as Habermas
does and as any reasonable person should, that constraints and distortions can be unconscious and hard to localize, we need to know how we
are supposed to recognize an ideal speech situation, a situation of undistorted communication. How do you tell when a disputant is acting out
of neurosis or false consciousness? It is unfortunately very likely that we
will recognize distorted communication only by its outcome, by whether
the parties after all arrive at a fair settlement. In that case, we have proceeded in a circle, defining justice in terms of consensus in the ideal
speech situation while specifying the ideal speech situation in terms of
how just its outcomes are.
The problem is precisely analogous to the terrible difficulties lawyers have found interpreting the notion of "unconscionable" agreements. Sometimes unconscionability seems to refer to the substance of
the agreement, sometimes to the bargaining process. It is temptingly
easy to fall into the vicious circle of saying "the process must have been
unfair, else it wouldn't have produced such a horrible outcome; the outcome is unconscionable, because the process was unfair." The only
general conclusion one can reach is that "unconscionability" is so in87
fected with ambiguity as to be nearly useless.
Before leaving the topic of empowerment, it is important to consider another version of the idea, one that overlaps with our earlier discussion of social justice. Handler's story provides an entry to this
version of empowerment. Recall that the mediators in the school-placement program attempted to make the parents more savvy about their
legal entitlements and sophisticated in their dealings with the bureaucracy. This was empowerment, to be sure, but empowerment of a particularly potent kind. It does not merely empower the parents for the
negotiation at hand and allow them to provide equally valued input
about today's dispute. It also empowers them for a whole range of future dealings with the bureaucracy. This is empowerment as pump
priming, which moves the empowered folks out of a position of dependency into an action-oriented position of self-reliance. It attempts to
86. Such as his belief that the ideal speech situation is "transcendental," that is, culturally universal, because it is built into the very structure of language, his view that empirical truth as well as moral agreement should be analyzed in terms of consensus, or, finally,
his very strong requirement that consensus on any issue must be achieved in an across-theboard consensus on all principles connected with this issue. See J. HABERMAS & N.
LUHMANN, supra note 83, at 320-21.
87. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor'sNew Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485
(1967).

1989]

THE QUALITY OFJUSTICE

transform them into self-moved movers.8 8
The politics of this version of empowerment are closely connected
with a view of poverty-law practice according to which the lawyer's job is
to mobilize and catalyze the clients rather than simply doing a job on
their behalf.8 9 For example, William Simon relates an anecdote Gary
Bellow tells about his practice for California Rural Legal Assistance.
Bellow once insisted on deposing an official in plain view of his farmworker clients. "I insisted that the deposition be taken in front of those
[farm-workers] so they could see me challenge him, question him, and
get information from him that they had previously been unable to obtain." 90 The experience proved so "empowering" to the clients that
they were able to force a victory in their dispute even though they ultimately lost on the legal issue.
This version of empowerment is an attractive conception ofjustice,
appealing to a vision of human autonomy and self-reliance and to active
political participation, which some philosophers9 ' have identified as the
most characteristically human good. As in our earlier discussion of social justice, however, it is important to remark that ADR is unlikely to be
an especially appropriate vehicle for this kind of empowerment. Once
again, the modified incentives argument implies that too much empowering activity on the part of neutrals will lead to underutilization of ADR
by the more powerful parties who find themselves getting goosed by the
process. Thus, ADR as political organizing is a machine that turns itself
off. Moreover, it is important to distinguish the roles of advocate and
neutral. It may well be the professional responsibility of the poverty
lawyer to empower her clients. 92 However, the neutral, unlike the advocate, necessarily has an equal responsibility to the other parties in ADR,
and it strikes me as inconsistent with the neutral's role to become what is
in effect an advocate for one of the disputants.
Reconciliation
The fourth criterion of justice is what I have called "reconciliation"-transforming the disputants and their mutual relationships so
that they come to acknowledge each other's point of view and common
humanity. One appealing version ofjustice as reconciliation is explicitly
religious:
88. Menkel-Meadow has assimilated such empowerment to what she terms the educative function of ADR, a function that also includes situations "when one or both parties
learn, on a metalevel, about conflict, its functions and dysfunctions, and how to think
about resolving them (where resolution is appropriate... )." Letter from Carrie MenkelMeadow to David Luban (November 14, 1987). I agree that the educative function of ADR
is valuable, though I do not believe that it constitutes an independent criterion ofjustice:
the education of disputants may lead to more justice in the future, but it does not in and of
itself mark an increase in justice.
89. Simon, infra note 90; Wexler, PracticingLaw for Poor People, 79 YALE LJ. 1049
(1970).
90. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469, 483 (1984).
91.
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Hebraic theology puts primary emphasis on relationships, a
priority that is political and even ontological, as well as ethical,
and therefore legal. And so, most radically, the religious tradition seeks not resolution . . . but reconciliation of brother to
brother, sister to sister, sister to brother, child to parent, neighbor to neighbor, buyer to seller, defendant to plaintiff, andjudge
9
to both. 3
Reconciliation theories need not be religiously based. Recent feminist
writing has emphasized reconciliation as a moral ideal. 94 Communitarian social theory also plays a role in the pursuit of a non-rule-bound,
informal restoration of solidarity. Thus, for example, Roberto Unger
contrasts legal formality to solidarity-which he describes as "the social
face of love . . . . love struggling to move beyond the circle of intimacy" 95-in terms that are virtually a textbook argument on behalf of
mediation:
There is a simple reason why no set of rules and principles can
do justice to the sentiment of solidarity. A legal order confers
entitlements and obligations ....
But solidarity means that
one takes no entitlements for granted. A powerholder who acts
out of a sense of solidarity will always have to ask himself
whether the exercise of his power in a particular situation
would be consistent with the aim of sharing the burden of the
people with whom he is dealing. To this question, there can
never be a general answer, laid down in advance. Everything
will depend on issues like the degree to which the other person
has acted wrongly in the particular relationship and his ability
to bear 6the loss that would result from the exercise of the
9
power.
These are precisely the issues that will be ventilated in good ADR. In
the workshop, Millhauser and Baruch-Bush suggested a reconciliatory
vision of quality. Baruch-Bush has defended a communitarian notion of
97
responsibility.
It is important to realize, however, that the goal of reconciliation
need not take a communitarian form. Consider, for example, the minitrial. In Gorske's example, executives from Wisconsin Electric Power
and American Can sat with a professional judge to hear an abbreviated
adversary presentation of the dispute by lawyers representing the two
companies. The idea of the mini-trial is to compel executive decision
makers to hear how strong the adversary's case is. In this way they come
to appreciate the adversary's viewpoint, and are more amenable to good
faith negotiation.
This is reconciliation if anything in ADR is, but I think it is clearly
93. McThenia & Shaffer, supra note 64, at 1666.
94. See C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). See also Menkel-Meadow, supra note
61.
95. R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY
(1976).
96. Id. at 207.
97. Bush, supra note 63. (Editor's note: For Professor Baruch-Bush's recent views see
his article in this issue.)
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wrong to describe the example in terms as hyperbolic and purple as Unger's. American Can's settlement with Wisconsin Electric Power had

nothing to do with love or solidarity.9 8 Nor can we speak of anything

like Martin Buber's I/Thou relationship: "When I confront a human being as my Thou and speak the basic word I-Thou to him, then he is no
thing among things nor does he consist of things ....Neighborless and
seamless, he is Thou and fills the firmament." 99 Buber would be startled, to say the least, to find the "basic word I-Thou" invoked in a context so clearly part of the realm of I-It as American Can's dispute with
Wisconsin Electric Power. 0 0
It seems evident that the kind of reconciliation, of transformation of
the parties, that takes place in a mini-trial, must be characterized in more
restrained terms than those we have been examining. The parties do
come to appreciate the other's viewpoint when ADR succeeds. They do
treat the other as a person rather than as a pothole in the highway of life.
In a word, they come to respect the other. It isn't love, it may not be
solidarity, but it is not to be denigrated. 10
The natural model here is Kant's injunction to respect other people
by treating them as ends in themselves, not as means-as beings who
have a "dignity," not a "price." Kant called the imaginary realm in
which everyone obeys this injunction the "Kingdom of Ends." The vision ofjustice as reconciliation that seems most clearly to correspond to
ADR is a vision in which ADR seeks to bring the Kingdom of Ends down
to earth.
Unger denigrates the appeal to respect: "Respect ... sets aside
each individual's distinctiveness .... Love differs from respect because
it prizes the loved one's humanity in the unique form of his individual
personality."' 0 2 This simply seems wrong. Respecting another is fully
compatible with coming to appreciate her individuality. As a matter of
fact, respecting another's point of view in a dispute is impossible if you set
aside her distinctiveness. On the flip side, it is just too much to expect
that ADR will transform angry adversaries into loving I's and Thou'sbut it is not too much to expect that it can transform them into people
who grudgingly and reluctantly admit that the other has a point and who
fairness, a mumbled
settle their dispute with a not-terribly-enthusiastic
03
"live and let live," and a handshake.1
98. Is this merely because the disputants are corporations rather than individuals? I
do not think so: the executive decision makers are individuals, and it is their reconciliation
that the mini-trial seeks.
99. M. BUBER, I AND THOU 59 (1970).

100. Yet McThenia and Shaffer do invoke Buber in their defense of ADR. See McThenia
& Shaffer, supra note 64, at 1666.
101. Buber deliberately used the second-person familiar du in his "I-Thou" (ich-du). In
German "du" is generally reserved for those with whom one is most intimate. For everyone else the formal "you" (Sie) is employed. Perhaps the best way to characterize reconciliation based on respect is to suggest that it transforms I-It relationships not to ich-du but to
ich-Sie relationships.
102. R. UNGER, supra note 95, at 206-07.
103. More fundamentally, if respect is good enough for Aretha Franklin, it's good
enough for me.
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One may quarrel with the very idea of making reconciliation the
touchstone of justice. Reconciliation seems to place a higher value on
social order and conviviality than on fairness, and one may fear that people can become reconciled in morally outrageous relationships. This realization is, after all, at the heart of the feminist critique of sexist
marriages.' 0 4 I shall not pursue this line of criticism here, for it quickly
moves us to a difficult debate about whether reconciliation into masterslave relationships counts as reconciliation in the sense that the proposal
intends. Instead, I wish simply to pursue the question of whether communitarian solidarity or Kantian respect provides a better reading of
what reconciliation is about.
Reconciliation based on respect is an unexciting and decidedly liberal idea, while the communitarian versions of reconciliation are often
coupled with critiques of liberalism. For this reason the stakes are large
in a debate between the two. Rather than venture into such troubled
waters, I shall merely offer one final argument in favor of the less titillating respect-based view of reconciliation.
That argument is based on the "publicity principle" of Kant and
Rawls. The publicity principle-intended as a moral requirement on
public policy-requires of any defensible policy that it be capable of
withstanding general, public knowledge that it is in place. The publicity
principle is meant to rule out secret or esoteric policies, and is perhaps
the backbone of democratic theory. I wish to ask which version of reconciliation best comports with the publicity principle. 10 5
My suspicion is that reconciliation as solidarity would run afoul of
the publicity principle. Could a mediator or arbitrator really kick off the
proceedings-an attempt to resolve a business dispute, let us say, in
which both disputing parties are quite angry with each other-by announcing: "The aim of these sessions is not merely to resolve your dispute. It is to do so by transforming you so that you come to regard each
other as fellow members of a loving community?" Surely the answer is
no. That may be the last thing the disputants want. They may hate each
other's guts. Even if the disputants were receptive to the idea of a loving
community, they would rightly suggest that the proposed transformation would be a welcome but incidental byproduct of a process the primary aim of which is merely to resolve the dispute. What the neutral
takes as the primary touchstone of justice-the transformation of the
disputants into people in solidarity-is not the aim of the disputants. At
best it is something they regard as strictly secondary; at worst it is a
104. See Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE LJ. 1669 (1985), and Luban, Some Greek Trials: Order
andJusticein Homer, Hesiod, Aeschylus and Plato, 54 TENN. L. REV. 279 (1987), for criticisms of
jurisprudential views that place harmony over justice in the ranking of social values.
Lerman rightly excoriates mediators in wife abuse cases who try to get the wife to change
the behavior that makes her husband beat her up, an example that Finley pressed forcefully in the workshop. See Lerman, supra note 1.
105. It may seem that the publicity principle is too strong, that it would rule out all
state secrets (including vital security information), but that is not correct. Provided that a
policy of keeping certain things secret can itself withstand public knowledge, secrecy is
consistent with the publicity principle.
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prospect they abhor. Because of this discrepancy, the neutral will have
to keep the reconciliation agenda hidden from the disputants. Thus,
this version of reconciliation violates the publicity principle.
Reconciliation as respect, on the other hand, is quite capable of
withstanding publicity. There is nothing at all untoward about the mediator explaining: "The aim of these sessions is not merely to settle your
dispute but to do so by getting you to appreciate and respect each
other's point of view." In fact, the parties probably understand already
that this is how mediation works. As Millhauser remarked, parties who
don't understand this, who gird their loins with full adversarial armor
when they enter ADR, are simply parties for whom ADR will fail.

IV.

AN INCONCLUSIVE CONCLUSION

This rather unsystematic survey of proposals about what constitutes
justice in ADR is intended to be diagnostic rather than critical. It appears that only one of the four proposals-larticipant satisfaction-is
clearly inadequate, and the discussion of the others has suggested limitations and complications rather than objections. If I am right in suspecting that beneath each proposal lies a general view of the good life,
then the debate among the proposals is unlikely to come to more closure than the debates in political philosophy and value theory that address the question of the good life. That is no resolution at all, for in
two thousand years no mainstream philosophical theory has ever gone
completely out of business.
This is bound to be dismaying to researchers, evaluators, and practitioners who want definite answers to questions raised by the quality
argument. However, I do not view the no-resolution idea as a counsel of
despair. Indeed, if it were possible to get decisive answers to the question, "What constitutes quality justice in alternative dispute resolution?"
while the hardy perennial debates about what justice itself is remained
unsettled, that would show merely that ADR is no instrument ofjustice.
In that case, the quality argument would receive an abrupt and skeptical
answer. The fact that ADR does raise the Hardy Perennials is an indicator that the quality argument passes the threshold of seriousness. Perhaps we should take comfort in the thought that the worth of an
institution can often be judged by the size of the questions it begs.

